The purpose of this paper is to examine the issue of behavioral reflexivity from a behavior-analytic perspective. Two quotations from behavioral researchers are first considered, and both suggest that behavioral reflexivity is an issue best ignored. The nature of behavioral reflexivity is then examined , in detail, by dividing it into three basic assumptions. This examination suggests that behavioral reflexivity precludes the possibility of finding an ontological (correspondence-based) truth in behavior analysis , and therefore the ontological truth of behavioral reflexivity itself is undermined. If a pragmatic truth criterion is adopted , however, the truth of behavioral reflexivity must be defined in terms of its usefulness in achieving particular goals, and thus the ontological truth of behavioral reflexivity becomes irrelevant. As a starting point for demonstrating the usefulness of behavioral reflexivity, an interpretive behavior analysis of behavioral reflexivity is conducted. This analysis suggests that behavioral reflexivity is produced, in large part , by the contingencies operating in the verbal community that establish responding to one's own behavior, and to "truth," in accordance with the relational frames of HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN . The analysis is then used as the basis for an exercise for teaching students about behavioral reflexivity. Insofar as this exercise is useful in achieving particular goals , behavioral reflexivity is a true and welcome feature of behavior analysis.
The above quotation suggests that behavior analytic epistemology considers the scientific activity of the behavior analyst to be part of a behavioral stream, and thus the science of behavior analysis consists of the very same stuff (behavior) that it takes as its subject matter. This position, which we shall call behavioral reflexivity,1 has created considerable discomfort within the behavior analytic community over the years. Schnaitter (1987) , for example, has argued that behavioral reflexivity, though obviously correct, is a conceptual issue best avoided: Doing science is performance under constraint, subject to its own analysis consisting of further performance under constraint, and so on. Just as one cannot perceive outside one's perceptions or think outside one's thoughts, so one cannot behave or perform outside one's behavior or performance, even when doing science. Be that as it may, more than a few well-intentioned behaviorists have been trapped by this captivating eddy in the behavioral stream . Undue engagement with this truism can endanger any sort of productive analysis of behavior. (pp. 5-6) Consider also the following passage written by Staddon (1993) in which he argued that behavioral reflexivity should be removed altogether from behavior analytic epistemology: [Others] may object that we, the experimenters, are also organisms, subject to the vaunted "laws" of behavior. We must (they contend) consider the implications of our laws for our own behavior. This is a surprisingly persuasive argument for many behavior analysts, but I believe it also is mistaken .... Subject (the scientist) and object (the thing he or she is studying) are different, and we have no evidence that a strategy that blurs the difference will advance any science. (p. 247) Despite the concern expressed by the foregoing authors with regard to behavioral reflexivity, we are of the firm opinion that the best way to deal with behavioral reflexivity is to embrace it fully, not as a conceptual, philosophical, or logical position, but as an example of the behavior of the scientist. In so doing, we hope to show that behavioral reflexivity is an important part of the "language game" we call behavior analysis.
In the first part of this paper we outline what we consider to be the nature of behavioral reflexivity by dividing it into three basic assumptions. Having outlined these assumptions, we then consider the implications of pragmatism for behavioral reflexivity, and we argue that the truth of behavioral reflexivity must be defined in terms of its usefulness in achieving particular goals. To demonstrate the usefulness of behavioral 10liver and Landfield (1963) argued that any psychological theory must be selfreferring or reflexive, in the sense of explaining the psychologist's own behavior. In the current paper we are concerned only with the reflexive nature of behavior analysis, and thus we shall use the term behavioral reflexivity. reflexivity, we conduct an interpretive behavior analysis of behavioral reflexivity that facilitates, in our opinion, a behavior analytic understanding of certain types of scientific behavior. Finally, we outline an exercise that we have used for teaching students about behavioral reflexivity.
The Three Assumptions of Behavioral Reflexivity

Assumption 1: What is Known is Always a Behavioral Function
In behavior analysis, all events are known or defined in terms of behavioral function, rather than as physical things that exist independently of behavior (see Skinner, 1938 , on the inseparability of stimuli and responses; see also Barnes & Roche, 1994; Hayes, L. J., 1993) . To understand this assumption of behavioral reflexivity, consider the simple case of a wedged-shaped piece of metal. In common-sense terms, the wedge is a physical thing that exists independently of behavior. In behavior analysis, however, the wedge is defined only in terms of its behavioral functions that emerge in a particular stream of behavioral interactions (see Barnes, 1989, pp. 340-341; Schoenfeld & Farmer, 1970) . The wedge, for instance, may be defined as a discriminative stimulus for a particular response, such as picking it up, or uttering "that's a metal wedge," or alternatively it may defined as a reinforcing stimulus for other responses, such as pointing at the wedge, or uttering "pass me the wedge." Even if the wedge in question is considered to be "imaginary" (e.g., a wedge with magical properties in a children's story book), such a wedge would still be defined behaviorally; in this case, however, terms such as autoclitic or metaphorical extension (Skinner, 1957) might be used to define the wedge. In behavior analysis, therefore, the wedge (or any other part of the universe) is always defined or known within a particular behavioral stream (see Barnes & Roche, 1994) .
Assumption 2: The Activity of Each Organism Participates in a Separate Behavioral Stream
Behavioral reflexivity does not allow one behavioral stream to overlap with, or intrude upon, a second behavioral stream. Consider, for example, a driver who stops at a red traffic light. In behavior analysis, we might define the red light as a discriminative stimulus for pressing on the brake, and we would explain this discriminative function in terms of the history of behavioral interactions that established the function. This history of behavioral interactions and the functional relation thus obtained between the red light and the braking response constitutes part of the driver's behavioral stream. Consider now, a second driver who also stops at the red traffic light. In common-sense terms, we would likely say that the red light is the same red light for both drivers. In behavior analysis, however, we must define two separate discriminative functions 2 for the two braking responses emitted by the drivers. In a sense, there are two red lights-one in each behavioral stream. In summary, therefore, Assumption 2 of behavioral reflexivity views the activity of each organism as participating in separate behavioral streams. Even when two organisms are responding to the "same" event (in common-sense terms), they do so from within their respective streams.
Assumption 3: The Scientific Activity of The Behavioral Analyst
Participates in a Behavioral Stream . According to the quotation presented at the beginning of this paper, even the scientific activity of a behavior analyst participates in a behavioral stream and thus he or she cannot "observe behavior from some special pOint of vantage, 'perched on the epicycle of Mercury.' " (Skinner, 1974, p. 234) . From this perspective, scientific activity does not involve discovering the fundamental laws of nature or developing an increasingly accurate picture of an ontological reality; instead, scientific activity itself is subject to a behavior analysis. Again, in Skinner's (1969) In behavior analysis, therefore, the output from a cumulative record, for example, is not a representation of what the subject "really" did in the operant chamber, but is rather a discriminative stimulus for a particular "scientific" response, such as "scallop" or "break-and-run," that has been differentially reinforced in the presence of that pattern. In effect, the scientific activity of a particular behavior analyst is always part of that scientist's behavioral stream.
Truth and Behavioral Reflexivity
Assumptions 1 and 2 of behavioral reflexivity, though strange from a common-sense point of view, create little difficulty for behavior analysis. 2Separate functions are defined for two main reasons. First, the history of behavioral interactions that established the discriminative function of the red light for the response of one of the drivers, cannot be identical to the history that established the function for the response of the other driver (e.g., one driver may have stopped previously at the traffic light, whereas the other may not). Insofar as a discriminative function is explained, in part, by the history of behavioral interactions that produced that function, then clearly the functions for the two drivers cannot be considered identical. Second, the discriminative function of the red light may be manipulated independently in one or other of the behavioral streams. Imagine, for example, that a passenger traveling with one of the drivers says; "Ignore the lights, I heard a report on the radio saying that they are all stuck on red:' In this case, the discriminative function of the red light may suddenly change in one behavioral stream, but not in the other (e.g., one driver will drive through the red light, while the other looks on in horror).
Assumption 3 of behavioral reflexivity, however, appears to preclude the possibility, in behavior analysis, of finding a truth that corresponds to an ontological reality. Furthermore, and more importantly for the current paper, Assumption 3 appears to undermine behavioral reflexivity itself. Consider the following. If the scientific activity of the behavior analyst is the product of that analyst's behavioral history, then he or she can never claim to have found an ontological truth, because a different or more extended history may have produced a different truth (an ontological truth, by definition, is immutable, absolute, and final). Furthermore, the argument that behavior analysis is reflexive cannot be true in an ontological sense because the argument is simply the product of a particular behavioral history. Behavioral reflexivity thus appears to sow the seeds of its own destruction. Nevertheless, truth in behavior analysis, including the truth of behavioral reflexivity itself, may be rescued if a pragmatic truth criterion is adopted. The rest of the current section is devoted to this issue.
When confronted with the problem of truth in behavior analysis, the most typical response is to point out that we never attempt to construct a scientific analysis that corresponds to an extant, ontological reality. Instead, behavior analysis is concerned only with a pragmatic version of the truth. From this perspective, truth is defined simply in terms of prediction and control (i.e., successful working). If a scientific statement is useful in helping the behavioral scientist to achieve the goals of prediction and control, with some degree of scope and precision, then the statement is considered true (see Barnes & Roche, 1994; Hayes, S. C., & Brownstein, 1986; Skinner, 1974, p. 235) . The correspondence between the scientific statement and an ontological reality is completely irrelevant. 3 In appealing to the pragmatic truth criterion of successful working, it appears that behavior analysis circumvents the problem of never finding an ontological truth. In other words, if behavior analysis is unconcerned with the ontological truth, then it can hardly be criticized for being unable to find such a truth. A point sometimes missed, however, is that although pragmatism addresses the issue of never finding an ontological truth in behavior analysis, the truth criterion of successful working does not undermine behavioral reflexivity (see Hayes, L. J., 1993) . In other words, the scientific goals of prediction and control do not allow the behavior analyst to step outside the behavioral stream, and make contact with a nonbehavioral, ontological reality. Consider the following two points. 3To define truth as "useful in achieving certain goals" is to define truth behaviorally (e.g., having a particular goal and trying to achieve it are behavioral events). The truth of a behavior-analytic statement must, therefore, be defined within a particular behavioral stream, and as such a truth statement is always inherently historical and context specific. From this perspective, ontology is simply irrelevant because the behavior analyst has no grounds on which to speak of hidden essences and underlying realities. That does not mean that ontological talk must be abandoned, however, because it may be useful at times to speak ontologically. With that caveat, the pragmatic behavior analyst takes the view that we cannot take ontological talk (or any talk) literally as it applies to an underlying philosophy of science or an underlying reality, because truth is just successful working-no more and no less.
First, stating that one's scientific goals are prediction and control, and then trying to achieve them must also be viewed in behavior analysis as behavioral events. Scientific goals cannot be considered objective truths handed down on tablets of stone from the god of ontology. In behavior analysis, therefore, the goals of a particular scientist are produced by that scientist's history of behavioral interactions, and as such the goals are part of a unique behavioral stream. In the words of Leigland (1993) :
How is it a particular scientist has actually chosen a particular set of goals over another? From the perspective of radical behaviorism , the answer ... is a matter of the variables, experiences, and contingencies that constitute an individual's history of contact with the social and non-social environment, and is not to be confused with the verbal reasons which we would normally provide as "explanations" (whether in the context of casual or philosophical discourse) for what we choose. (p. 30)
In a sense, therefore, the scientific goals of prediction and control are purely an accident of history. If, for example, a particular behavior analyst had been taught by different professors who emphasized prediction over control, the analyst may have become a different type of psychologist or perhaps pursued an entirely different career. Furthermore, even if two specific behavior analysts claim and pursue the goals of prediction and control, their different histories may lead each of them to "interpret" these goals differently (see Hayes, L. J., 1993, p. 40-41) . Consider, for example, the different approaches suggested by Murray Sidman and Steven Hayes to the issue of stimulus equivalence (see Barnes, 1994; Barnes & Roche, 1996) . Second, in adopting the pragmatic goals of prediction and control a behavior analyst may often talk as if "real" events were being contacted outside of the behavioral stream, but according to behavioral reflexivity such talk is ultimately considered to be a particular instance of scientific verbal behavior. Imagine, for the sake of argument, that in the course of an experimental analysis a behavior analyst discovers that whenever he or she arranges for event X to occur, event V always follows. If the analyst then states that "X produces goal V," surely this requires a correspondence between the goal-statement and the X-then-V event? According to behavioral reflexivity, however, the goal-statement is a behavioral event, and thus no correspondence between the statement and a nonbehavioral, ontological reality need be assumed. In technical terms, we might interpret the goal-statement as follows: A history of arbitrarily applicable relational responding established a transformation of functions in accordance with the mutually entailed relation of coordination between the event, X followed by V, and the goal-statement "X produces goal Y." This technical vocabulary highlights that the goalstatement is treated as a behavioral event that is functionally related to other behavioral events in a behavioral stream. The issue of correspondence, therefore, is simply irrelevant. Of course, even the foregoing technical interpretation itself is subject to further analysis, and thus it too does not necessarily correspond to an ontological reality.4 (The requirement that analytic statements in behavior analysis are always subject to further analysis does, however, create a problem for behavioral reflexivity, and we shall address this issue in the final paragraph of this section).
Having seen that pragmatism does not undermine behavioral reflexivity, we now come to the truth of behavioral reflexivity itself. As suggested at the beginning of this section, the argument for behavioral reflexivity cannot be true ontologically. Instead, the argument for behavioral reflexivity is a verbal event that is functionally related to other verbal and nonverbal behavioral events that go to make up a particular behavioral stream, and as such the truth of the argument rests solely on its functional utility as defined in that stream. The question is therefore; what goal or goals have we, the authors, achieved in focusing on the issue of behavioral reflexivity? We have two answers to this question. First, having conducted an interpretive behavior analysis of behavioral reflexivity itself, presented in the next section, we now understand, more clearly than hitherto, certain properties of scientific behavior. Second, we have developed an exercise for teaching students about behavioral reflexivity that appears to increase their approval of, and interest in, behavior analysis.
At this point we might be criticized for giving the impression that, in analyzing and/or teaching behavioral reflexivity, one somehow steps outside of one's behavioral stream and makes direct contact with a "real" ontological event called behavioral reflexivity. This, however, was not our intention. According to behavioral reflexivity, when analyzing or teaching one is behaving-even in reading this sentence you, the reader, are behaving. The putative ubiquity of one's own behavior brings us to the most troublesome feature of the truth of behavioral reflexivity. The trouble appears to be that the ubiquity of one's own behavior cannot be analyzed, at least in the traditional sense. To determine that one is always behaving requires that one behaves, and then analyzes that behavior without engaging in any further behavion Trying to achieve this goal leads to a form analytic tail chasing. Having analyzed one's own behavior, one cannot conclude that one is always behaving because the act of analyzing one's own behavior remains unanalyzed. One must, therefore, analyze one's analysis, and then one is forced to analyze that analysis of the analysis, and so on, ad infinitum. The idea that one is 4The idea that a behavior analyst is unable to say anything that corresponds to an ontological reality may be seen by some as an unbearable conceptual or even psychological burden. In other words, if even scientific statements are behavioral events, and as such are not ontologically true, what is the point in doing science? Interestingly, however, Skinner (1974) did not appear to be overly concerned with this issue when he wrote: "If human behavior is as fully determined as the behaviorist says it is, why does he bother to write a book? Does he believe that anything matters? . . . Similar questions might as well be asked of the author of a book on respiration: 'If that is respiration , why do you go on breathing? ' " (pp. 247-248).
always behaving may therefore lead to a never ending cycle of futile analyses, and as such the utility or truth of behavioral reflexivity is apparently threatened. In the next two sections, however, we will attempt to show that the ubiquity of behavior suggested by behavioral reflexivity may, in fact, serve a useful purpose.
A Behavior Analytic Interpretation of Behavioral Reflexivity
We will now conduct an interpretive behavior analysis of behavioral reflexivity itself, focusing primarily on Assumption 3 and the ubiquity of behavior. We focus on these issues because they have attracted the most attention over the years, and in a sense they go to the very heart of behavioral reflexivity. The analysis will draw heavily on relational frame theory, and the ideas expressed in the paper Making Sense of Spirituality by Steven Hayes (1984) . In essence, we will argue that the contingencies that establish responding to one's own behavior in accordance with the relational frames of "HERE and THERE" and "NOW and THEN" are also involved in producing behavioral reflexivity, and in particular the tail-chasing phenomenon.
Relational Frame Theory and the Frames of HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN
According to relational frame theory,S learning to name objects and events in the world represents one of the earliest and most important forms of arbitrarily applicable relational responding. For instance, parents often utter the name of an object in the presence of their young child and then reinforce any orienting response that occurs towards the named object. This interaction may be described as, hear name A ~ look at object B. Parents also often present an object to their young child and then model and reinforce an appropriate "tact" (Skinner, 1957) . This interaction may be described as see object B ~ hear and say name A (see Barnes, 1994 , for a detailed discussion). Initially, each interaction may require explicit reinforcement for it to become firmly established in the behavioral repertoire of the child, but after a number of exemplars have been trained, derived "naming" may be possible. Suppose, for example, a child with this naming history is told "This is your shoe." Contextual cues, such as the word "is" and the naming context more generally, may establish a transformation of pointing and speaking functions, for the shoe, in accordance with the mutually entailed relation of coordination. Without further training, for example, the child will now point to the shoe when asked "Where is your shoe?" (name A ~ object 5The conceptual and empirical details of relational frame theory have been outlined elsewhere, many times before (see, for example, Barnes, 1994; Barnes, 1996; Barnes & Holmes, 1991; Barnes & Roche, 1996; Hayes, S. C., 1991 Hayes, S. C., , 1994 Hayes, S. C., & Hayes, L. J. , 1989 ,1992 Hayes, S. C., & Wilson, 1993 Lipkens, Hayes, S. C., & Hayes, L. J., 1993) . Furthermore, detailed knowledge of the theory is not required to understand the current interpretation, and thus we will not trudge over well-worn ground in the current paper. B) and will utter "shoe" when presented with the shoe and asked "What is this?" (object B--+ name A).
In addition to naming, many other patterns of arbitrarily applicable relational responding are established during a child's interaction with the verbal community (see Barnes, 1994; Dymond & Barnes, 1995; Hayes, S. C., 1991; Steele & Hayes, S. C., 1991) . In our opinion, however, the most important relational frames for the current interpretation of behavioral reflexivity are, what we will call, the relational frames of HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN.6 This type of relational framing activity is established when the verbal community teaches a young girl, for example, to discriminate her own perspective as separate from that of others. According to Hayes, S. C. (1984) , this relational activity emerges when the girl is taught not only to discriminate her own behavior (Le., to see that she sees), but to discriminate her own behavior from a consistent locus or perspective (Le., the child sees that she a/ways sees from her own perspective):
First, words such as "here" and "there" are acquired which do not refer to a specific thing but to a relation to the child's point of view. For example, "there" is always anywhere else but "here" and "here" is always "from this locus or point of view". Second, children are taught to distinguish their perspective from that of others. Young children have a hard time with the issue of perspective. For example, young children seated across from a doll will, when asked, report that the doll sees what they are seeing. Gradually, however a sense of perspective emerges. A child learns what he or she sees is seen from a perspective. Similarly, a young child, asked what she had for breakfast, may respond with what her brother actually ate, but an older child will not make such a mistake. Through correction, ("No, that is what your brother ate. What did you eat?") a child must learn to see seeing from a consistent locus .... Suppose a child can give correct answers to the question "what did you x 1" where "x' is a wide variety of events such as eat, feel, watch, and so on. The events constantly change. In our terms, the seeing and the seeing seeing change. Only the locus does not. Thus, one consistency between the word "you" in such questions and behavior is not seeing or seeing seeing but the behavior of seeing that you see from a particular locus or perspective. Thus, in some real sense, "you" are the perspective. (Hayes, S. C., 1984, pp. 102-103; emphasis in original) In summary, the child's interaction with the verbal community 6The following analysis in terms of the relational frames of HERE and THERE , and NOW and THEN obviously focuses on four words used in the English speaking verbal community. Of course, responding in accordance with these frames is also found in many other language communities who use different words with similar functions (e.g ., ICI in French is functionally equivalent to HERE). Nevertheless, such responding may not be universal. The Hopi , for example, appear to respond in accordance with frames that may be described as HERE and STATIC, and NOW and EMERGING (see Whorf, 1956 ).
establishes the relational frames of HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN and the child is taught to discriminate her own behavior as always located in the same positions in the two relational frames (i.e., she is always behaving HERE and NOW, and not THERE and THEN). This type of relational framing thus generates a perspective, or context, from which all things and events are experienced (see Figure 1) .
HERE/ NOW
TIIERE / THEN
Chi1d Reality Figure 1 . A diagrammatic representation of a child responding in accordance with the relational frames of HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN. The child's perspective is always located HERE and NOW, and "reality" is always located THERE and THEN.
Once the relational frames of HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN are established in the behavior of a particular person they become an inherent property of most verbal events for that person. Whenever the person talks to someone else it will be from the perspective of HERE and NOW about events that occurred THERE and THEN. The simple greeting, "How are you?" for example, locates the speaker HERE and NOW, and the listener THERE and THEN. In effect, the speaker is asking, HERE and NOW, for a response from the listener that will occur THERE (two or three feet away) and THEN (in a second or two). Even when talking to oneself a person responds in accordance with these relational frames. Imagine, for example, that a speaker utters the self-deprecating statement "I'm really stupid," having spent two hours solving what the speaker considers to be a relatively simple problem. In this instance, the statement locates the speaker's current behavior HERE and NOW (having solved the problem) talking about the speaker' behavior THERE and THEN (before the problem was solved). In summary, the relational frames of HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN establish a constant division between the speaker and the spoken about. The speaker is always HERE and NOW, and the spoken about is always THERE and THEN.
A Relational Frame Interpretation of Behavioral Reflexivity
How may we use the concept of relational frames to construct a behavior-analytic interpretation of behavioral reflexivity? Basically, our argument is as follows. When a behavior analyst is confronted with the reflexive nature of behavior analysis, the behavioral functions of the word "truth" (as established by the wider verbal community) repeatedly shift from HERE and NOW to THERE and THEN in the relational frames. This shifting of truth functions may cause the behavior analyst to deny or avoid behavioral reflexivity, or alternatively it may change the way in which the behavior analyst responds to "truth." To appreciate fully this interpretation, consider the following scenarios.
Scenario 1: Relational responding to ontological truth is restricted to one statement. Imagine a behavior analyst who reads Skinner's (1974) statement:
It would be absurd for the behaviorist to contend that he is in any way exempt from his analysis. He cannot step outside of the causal stream and observe behavior from some special point of vantage, 'perched on the epicycle of Mercury.' In the very act of analyzing human behavior he is behaving. (p. 234) Having read this passage, the behavior analyst may conclude that finding the truth in behavior analysis is impossible. This conclusion emerges for the following reason. Truth in the behavior analyst's wider verbal community normally depends upon the putative correspondence between statements made HERE and NOW about an ontological reality located THERE and THEN (see Hayes, L. J., 1993). In common sense terms, reality is always waiting, THERE and THEN, to be described truthfully, HERE and NOW. (Of course, untrue statements are also located HERE and NOW about THERE and THEN, but in this case no correspondence to "reality" is assumed). Given this verbal context, the behavior analyst therefore starts by responding to scientific truth statements, located HERE and NOW, as corresponding to an ontological reality, located THERE and THEN; we will refer to this "correspondencebased" truth as ontological (see Figure 2 , upper panel). Having read Skinner's (1974) "reflexive" passage, however, ontological truth statements, as examples of scientific behavior, shift to THERE and THEN in the relational frames (i.e., ontological truth is behavior waiting, THERE and THEN, to be analyzed). Consequently, the behavior analyst is unable to utter an ontologically true statement (HERE and NOW) about a behavioral reality (THERE and THEN) because the relational functions of HERE and NOW, that would normally be attached to that truth statement, have been replaced by the relational functions of THERE and THEN (Figure 2, middle panel) . In other words, the behavior analyst concludes that no scientific statement will ever truly correspond or refer to an ontological reality because any such statement itself will always be part of that reality. Paradoxically, however, even in drawing this conclusion the behavior analyst is still responding to an ontological truth as located HERE and NOW in the relational frames. In other words, when the behavior analyst says, "Scientific statements cannot correspond to reality," he or she responds to this statement (located HERE and NOW) as referring to an ontological lack of correspondence between scientific statements and reality (located THERE and THEN) (Figure 2, lower panel) . At this point, therefore, responding to ontological truth has been restricted to this one and only statement. Scenario 2: The behavior analyst fails to adopt the pragmatic truth criterion. Having reached the point outlined in Scenario 1, imagine that the behavior analyst now reads the following passage from Skinner (1974): [Scientific knowledge] is a corpus of rules for effective action, and there is a special sense in which it could be 'true' if it yields the most effective action possible. . . (A) proposition is 'true' to the extent that with its help the listener responds effectively to the situation it describes. (p. 235) At this point, the relational functions of THERE and THEN that were attached to "reality," at the beginning of Scenario 1, are now attached to the term "effective action." In effect, the behavior analyst concludes that any scientific statement, located HERE and NOW, is true to the extent that it leads to effective action (located THERE and THEN) (Figure 3 , upper panel). Note, however, that although the behavior analyst has apparently adopted the pragmatic truth criterion of successful working, paradoxically, he or she is responding to statements made about effective action as ontologically true (i.e., a statement made about effective action is perceived to be true in some absolute or nonbehavioral sense). Consider what happens, therefore, if the behavior analyst then reads the passage from Leigland (1993): How is it a particular scientist has actually chosen a particular set of goals over another? From the perspective of radical behaviorism, the answer ... is a matter of the variables, experiences, and contingencies that constitute an individual's history of contact with the social and non-social environment. (p. 30) Leigland's words lead the behavior analyst to conclude that his or her scientific goal of effective action is not the best or most scientific goal in some ontological sense, because a different behavioral history may have produced a different goal, or at least a different interpretation of that goal. In effect, the goal is not separate or independent from the behavior of the behavior analyst. Insofar as the truth is defined in terms of effective action, which in turn is the product of the behavior analyst's behavioral history, the truth is again behavior waiting, THERE and THEN, to be analyzed. In effect, the relational functions of HERE and NOW attached to the word "truth" (in behavior analysis) have again been replaced by the relational functions of THERE and THEN. At this point, The relational functions of THERE and THEN are attached to the term "effective action," and thus the behavior analyst concludes that any scientific statement, located HERE and NOW, is ontologically true to the extent that it leads to effective action (located, THERE and THEN). Lower panel: Effective action is discriminated as a behavioral event and thus the behavior analyst is forced to state that "truth is a property of my own behavior." Relational responding to ontological truth has been restricted to this single statement, located HERE and NOW, corresponding to truth and behavior, located THERE and THEN. therefore, the behavior analyst is forced to state that "scientific truth is a property of my own behavior" (Hayes, S. C., 1993). In effect, relational responding to ontological truth has been restricted to this single statement, located HERE and NOW, about truth and behavior, located THERE and THEN (Figure 3, lower panel) . Note again, however, that although the behavior analyst has apparently adopted the truth criterion of successful working, paradoxically, he or she is responding to statements made about this truth criterion itself as ontologically true (e.g., the statement, "scientific truth is a property of my own behavior" is perceived to be true in a literal or nonbehavioral sense). In effect, the behavior analyst is not behaving in accordance with the truth criterion of successful working.
Scenario 3: Verbal tail chasing: The behavior analyst rejects either behavioral reflexivity or ontological truth. Having reached the point outlined in Scenario 2, the behavior analyst's last statement may itself be discriminated as a behavioral event (e.g., the behavior analyst may say, "Even the statement, 'scientific truth is simply a property of my own behavior' is more behavior."). At this point. the behavior analyst's original statement about truth and behavior is located THERE and THEN in the relational frames, and thus responding to the phrase "Truth is a property of my own behavior" is no longer discriminated as ontologically true (Figure 4 , upper panel). The ontologically true statement is now the second one uttered by the behavior analyst (Le., "Even the statement, 'scientific truth is simply a property of may own behavior' is more behavior."). In effect, the behavior analyst is responding to the second statement as located HERE and NOW, and to the first statement as located THERE and THEN. The second statement, of course, may be discriminated as yet more behavior, if the behavior analyst says, "But even that statement is more behavior." (Le., the relational functions of HERE and NOW attached to the second statement are replaced by the functions of THERE and THEN) (Figure 4 , lower panel). This cycle of relational responding to "ontological truth" in accordance with HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN may continue indefinitely, as the behavior analyst repeatedly tries to utter an ontological truth located HERE and NOW about his or her ontologically real behavior located THERE and THEN. In effect, the behavior analyst chases the ever changing verbal event, stating "but that is more behavior, and that is more behavior, and that is more behavior ... " This verbal tail chasing may terminate in two ways. First, the verbal tail chase terminates when the behavior analyst states (HERE and NOW) that behavioral reflexivity (THERE and THEN) is "unproductive," "nonfunctional," "cannot be understood," and so forth. More specifically, for example, the behavior analyst may state: "Although behavioral reflexivity is true, it emerges because it is physically impossible to analyze an event, and analyze that analysis simultaneously, and thus we should avoid getting caught up in this futile cycle of analyses:' In effect, the relational functions of HERE and NOW are permanently attached to an "ontologically true" statement that defines behavioral reflexivity as unproductive, etc. (Figure 5 The behavior analyst states HERE and NOW "my last statement was behavior," and thus the previous statement (i.e., "truth is a property of my own behavior") is located THERE and THEN in the relational frames. Lower panel: The behavior analyst states HERE and NOW, "And my last statement was even more behavior," and thus the previous statement "My last statement was behavior" shifts to THERE and THEN in the relational frames. upper panel). In fact, the denial or avoidance of behavioral reflexivity is the most likely outcome, insofar as the behavior analyst has been exposed to a long history of reinforcement for making ontological truth statements, HERE and NOW, about events, THERE and THEN. The behavior analyst states, HERE and NOW, that behavioral reflexivity, THERE and THEN , is, for example, "unproductive," or "non-functional." The relational functions of HERE and NOW are permanently attached to the ontologically true statement that "behavioral reflexivity is unproductive." Lower panel: The behavior analyst's repeated failure to locate the truth HERE and NOW in the relational frames causes this form of relational responding to habituate and produces a "meditative" event. In effect, the behavior analyst stops locating the ontological truth HERE and NOW in the relational frames.
The second way in which the verbal tail chasing may terminate is far less likely than the first. This outcome occurs when the behavior analyst's repeated failure to locate the ontological truth HERE and NOW in the relational frames causes this form of relational responding to habituate. As outlined previously, whenever the behavior analyst discriminates an ontological truth statement as occurring HERE and NOW, he or she subsequently discriminates the statement as another behavioral event (THERE and THEN), and thus the statement ceases to have any ontological truth functions. If this cycle continues, the rapid and repeated shifting of truth statements from HERE and NOW to THERE and THEN eventually causes this relational response to habituate, such that any "truth" statement uttered by the behavior analyst is immediately discriminated as a behavioral event occurring THERE and THEN. At this point, therefore, anything the behavior analyst says or thinks is neither true nor false ontologically. This is a strange experience for the behavior analyst, not unlike the behavior produced by some forms of meditation. In the same way that dispassionate observation of spontaneous thoughts and feelings is encouraged in Buddhist forms of meditation, for example (see Hayes, S. C., 1984) , a similar effect occurs as the behavior analyst responds HERE and NOW to each "truth" statement as simply another behavioral event (THERE and THEN) ( Figure 5, lower panel) .
Of course, the "meditative" behavior terminates sooner or later when the behavior analyst discriminates a statement or thought as occurring HERE and NOW, rather than THERE and THEN. At this pOint, however, the loss of ontological truth functions during the meditative event may generalize to statements made HERE and NOW, such that they are no longer discriminated as ontologically true. In other words, responding to multiple "truth" statements as behavioral events convinces the behavior analyst that the search for ontological truth is a futile endeavor. For example, the behavior analyst might state: "Having just experienced the behavioral nature of "truth" itself, I am forced to conclude that no one will ever know if any "truth" genuinely reflects or corresponds to an ontological reality." As described below, it is at this point that the behavior analyst may begin responding in accordance with the pragmatic truth criterion, and thereby avoid any further tail-chasing behavior.
We suggested previously that when the behavior analyst apparently adopted the pragmatiC truth criterion (Scenario 2), he or she responded to a truth statement made about "effective action" (or to a statement made about the pragmatic truth criterion itself) as ontologically true (Le., the statement, located HERE and NOW, corresponded to an event, -located THERE and THEN). When such a statement was discriminated as a behavioral event (located THERE and THEN) the statement ceased to be true, and thus the tail chase continued as the behavior analyst tried once more to utter a statement located HERE and NOW that corresponded to an event located THERE and THEN. Following the meditative event and the general loss of ontological truth functions, however, a true statement is no longer discriminative for correspondence (between HERE and NOW, and THERE and THEN) . At this point, therefore, achieving "effective action" becomes the only discriminative function available for responding to a scientific statement as true ( Figure 6 , upper panel). In effect, the behavior analyst now responds to a truth statement as located HERE and NOW, in relation to an event located THERE and THEN, because doing so is discriminated as useful in achieving a particular scientific goal.7 Furthermore, if such a pragmatic truth statement is subsequently discriminated as a behavioral event (THERE and THEN), the statement remains true because its usefulness (not its correspondence to an ontological reality) is discriminative for calling it true (Figure 6 , lower panel). In short, by responding to true statements pragmatically, rather than ontologically, the behavior analyst thus avoids further tail chasing behavior-if a statement remains true when it shifts from HERE and NOW to THERE and THEN in the relational frames, there is no immediate motivation for uttering another "true" statement located HERE and NOW. Of course, once the behavior analyst has concluded that a pragmatic truth statement remains true after discriminating it as a behavioral event, this conclusion itself may be discriminated as a behavioral event (Figure 7, upper panel) . Whether or not the behavior analyst engages in any further tail chasing, however, depends upon whether he or she discriminates such tail-chasing behavior as likely to produce effective action in the present context (Figure 7, lower panel) . In other words, even the truth of the pragmatic truth criterion is responded to pragmatically (i.e., in terms of effective action).
Implications Arising From the Interpretation of Behavioral Reflexivity
At this point we have two outcomes arising from the pursuit of behavioral reflexivity. The first outcome leads to the denial or avoidance of behavioral reflexivity, whereas the latter leads to the rejection of ontological truth. On the face of it, both outcomes produce a behavior analyst who engages in productive scientific behavior, and thus either option may appear equally acceptable. Some might argue, however, that the foregoing interpretation shows that rejecting or avoiding behavioral reflexivity is the simplest or least confusing option 8 (see Schnaitter, 7When the behavior analyst utters a pragmatic truth statement, HERE and NOW, in relation to an event, THERE and THEN, it may appear as if he or she is discriminating a correspondence between the statement and the event. However, if the behavior analyst is asked whether the statement does, in fact, reflect or correspond to the event he or she may simply reply; "I don't know, and I don't care -I found making the statement useful, and that is all that matters." 8Rejecting behavioral reflexivity does not necessarily require that one accept ontological truth. In effect, an argument could be made for taking both options (reject behavioral reflexivity and ontological truth). A detailed examination of this argument, however, is beyond the scope of the current paper (but see Barnes & Roche , 1994) . Furthermore, in the next section we argue for the acceptance of behavioral reflexivity which clearly rules out taking both options. Parenthetically, we assume that no one would seriously argue for accepting both behavioral reflexivity and ontological truth, insofar as they clearly represent contradictory positions. Figure 6 . Upper panel: The meditative event produces a general loss of ontological truth and thus the functions of "effective action" take control. Truth statements are now pragmatic, rather than ontological. Lower panel: When a pragmatic truth statement is discriminated as a behavioral event (shifts to THERE and THEN) , it remains true by virtue of its usefulness. In effect, the behavior analyst discriminates the use of the term "equivalence responding" as effective action .
1987; Staddon, 1993; Zuriff, 1995, pp. 399-340) . When teaching, for example, simply telling our students that behavioral reflexivity is a useless dead end avoids any "futile" verbal tail chasing and allows us to get on with the business of teaching them about the principles of behavior analysis. If, however, we delve into the verbal whirlpool of behavioral reflexivity, we run the risk of confusing our students (and perhaps ourselves) and waste valuable time on a behavioral phenomenon that is of little practical use. In contrast to this argument, however, we have found that our pursuit and current interpretation of behavioral reflexivity, including any resultant confusion, may be usefully harnessed, in certain contexts, for the purposes of teaching students about behavior analysis. The remainder of the current paper is devoted to this issue. <n!I1 etrective action) "My previous statement was useful behavior, and so it remains true" "equivalence 
An Exercise for Teaching About Behavioral Reflexivity9
Students often come to psychology interested in issues that are traditionally considered to be outside the purview of behavior analysis. Terms such as "Self," "Meditation," "Altered States of Consciousness," and the like are the main "attractors." Unfortunately, however, the consensus of opinion appears to be that behavior analysis has little to offer students interested in these areas. Of course, we might well bemoan the misrepresentation of our discipline by nonbehavioral psychologists (e.g., Spinelli, 1989, p. 175 ) and point to various examples 9The exercise presented in the current paper is a modified version of a technique used in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy for undermining excessive rule-following (Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, & Wilson , in press ). The Teacher-Student dialogues presented in this section are based on recordings made during the course "Conceptual Issues in Behavior Analysis" run by the first author at University College Cork. of behavior analytic interpretations of "Self" and so forth (e.g., Skinner, 1974) , but is this really enough to turn the tide of misinformation? In our experience it is not. When we first started teaching we had students review and discuss Skinner's text "About Behaviorism" in our tutorials, and more often than not they still concluded that "behaviorism" was, for example, "cold," "boring," and "simplistic." We therefore looked at what our other "more popular" colleagues were doing in their tutorials and found that they often engaged the students in "experiential" exercises to demonstrate the relevance of a particular area in psychology to the students' own lives (see Keenan, in press ). More recently, therefore, we have adopted this strategy for our tutorial work in behavior analysis.
When teaching students about behavior analytic epistemology, one inevitably has to deal with the issue of behavioral reflexivity. In dealing with this issue in our respective courses, we normally present a simplified version of the material covered thus far in the current paper, and then invite our respective students to engage in a brief relationalframe exercise. The students are informed that the exercise is designed to help them experience their own responding to ontological truth in accordance with the relational frames of HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN. The students are also told that designing and doing the exercise with them is, in a sense, a behavior analytic response to the "problem" of behavioral reflexivity (we will return to this issue in the final section of the paper). Before starting the exercise, the students are reminded that this form of relational responding is a behavior that was established in early childhood, and it has been reinforced incessantly by the verbal community, and as such, the behavior is particularly difficult to extinguish.
The Exercise: Contacting One's Own Responding to Ontological Truth in Accordance with the Relational Frames of HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN
Teacher: I'd like us to do an exercise to show how difficult it is to cease responding to "ontological truth" in accordance with the relational frames of HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN. In this way, you should get a feeling for what our "imaginary" behavior analyst experienced during the verbal tail chase that I just described. All I'm going to ask you to do is to think whatever thoughts you think and to allow them to flow, one thought after another. The purpose of the exercise is to notice when there's a shift from locating your thoughts THERE and THEN to locating them HERE and NOW. When your thoughts are located THERE and THEN, in a sense, you will perceive them to be just thoughts and as such neither true nor false, ontologically. But when your thoughts are located HERE and NOW, in a sense, you will respond to them as ontologically true. This sounds a bit weird, I know, but just give the exercise a go and see what happens. I'm going to ask you to imagine that you are sitting comfortably by the side of a stream on a warm summers day. As you sit by the stream leaves float by on the water, and each thought you have is a sentence written on one of these leaves. Some people have a hard time putting thoughts into words, and they see thoughts as images. If that applies to you, put each image on a leaf floating down the stream. Does everyone feel happy with this so far?
Students: General agreement [if anyone seems unwilling to participate, they may be invited to leave].
Teacher: Okay. In a minute I am going to help you relax, and then I want you to begin letting your thoughts go by written on the floating leaves. Now here is the task. The task is simply to watch the leaves go by without having it stop and without finding yourself carried off down the stream on a leaf. You are just supposed to let it flow. It is very unlikely, however, that you will be able to do this without interruption. And this is the key part of this exercise. At some point you will have the sense that the stream has disappeared, or that you have lost the point of the exercise, or that you are down in the stream, or on a leaf, instead of being on the bank. When that happens, I would like you to back up a few seconds and see if you can catch what you were doing right before the stream disappeared. Then go ahead and put your thoughts on the leaves again, until the stream disappears a second time, and so on. The main thing is to notice when it disappears for any reason and see if you can catch what happened right before it disappeared. Okay? Students: General agreement [again, if anyone seems unwilling to participate, they may be invited to leave].
Teacher: One more thing. If the stream and the leaves never get going at all and you start thinking "it's not working", or "I'm not doing this right" then let that thought be written on a leaf and send it down the stream. Okay. Now let's get comfortable, close your eyes, get settled into your chair and follow my voice. If you find yourself wandering, just gently come back to the sound of my voice. For a moment now, turn your attention to yourself in this room. Picture the room. Picture yourself in this room and exactly where you are. Now begin to go inside your skin, and get in touch with your body. Notice how you are sitting in the chair. See if you can notice exactly the shape that is made by the parts of your skin that touch the chair. Notice any bodily sensations that are there. As you see each one, just sort of acknowledge that feeling and then move on. [pause] . Now picture yourself by the side of the stream. You stay up on the bank looking at the leaves float by. If the stream disappears, or the leaves stop floating by, or you find yourself on a leaf, or in the stream itself, note that, and see if you can notice what you were doing right before that happened. Then get back up on the bank, and let the leaves begin to float by again. Okay, let's begin ... Whatever you think, just put it on the leaves, . . . [for about three to five minutes, allow the group to work. Don't underdo it timewise, and use very few words. Try to read where the group are and add a few comments as needed, like "just let it flow and notice when it stops". Don't engage in conversation with any member of the group. If a student opens his or her eyes calmly ask that they be closed and the exercise be continued. If a student starts to talk, gently suggest that even that thought be put on a leaf, saying something like, "we will talk more about this when the exercise is finished, but for now there is no need to talk with me. Whatever you think you want to say, let that thought be written down and let it float by too"]. Okay, now we will let the last few leaves float by, and we will begin to think about coming back to this room [pause] . Now again picture yourself in this room. And now picture· the room. Picture (describe the room). And when you are ready to come back into the room, open your eyes. Welcome back.
Teacher: Okay, any comments? Student 1: It was quite difficult to keep it going. I was okay for a while, and then suddenly I realized that I was off thinking about something completely different. Teacher: In other words, the thought was located HERE and NOW, about events next summer, THERE and THEN. Can we say it this way? At some point you engaged in a piece of private verbal behavior (Le., you had a thought) and you failed to respond to it as located THERE and THEN. The thought was located HERE and NOW, and thus it became "ontologically true," in the sense that you believed that you really could fail an exam next summer. So you start actually working out what might happen, what you will do, and so on, and at that point the stream and the leaves are gone. The thought is no longer an "ontologically truthless" event that you respond to dispassionately as it floats down the stream. Instead you are dealing with the "ontological truth" of exam failure and financial problems next year. The thought is happening HERE and NOW about events THERE and THEN. Teacher: So you were sort of cycling between responding to your thoughts as THERE and THEN, on the leaves and therefore neither true nor false ontologically, and HERE and NOW when you got carried off by the thought and it therefore became ontologically true? Teacher: Right. Isn't it the case that every time the stream disappeared, it was because you responded to a thought as located HERE and NOW, rather than located THERE and THEN. In effect, as soon as you responded to a thought as ontologically true, rather than as just another thought, you immediately got carried off by the "ontological truth" of that thought. [Process some of the other students' comments in a similar way, and then round up with the following] Teacher: Okay. Thanks for sharing your experiences with the group. That was great. The point of the exercise was to get you to experience the difference between responding to a thought as neither true nor false ontologically, located THERE and THEN, and responding to a thought as onto logically true, located HERE and NOW (i.e., when you forgot about the exercise and were carried off by the "ontological truth" of the thought).
In the same way that the verbal tail chasing undermined ontological truth for the behavior analyst, the floating leaf exercise can help you perceive your thoughts about yourself and the world as not ontologically true. In fact, this can be very useful. The next time you feel anxious or down about something use the exercise. For example, if you find yourself thinking, "I'm not clever enough to pass this course, I might as well give up now," try putting that thought on a leaf, and see how your reaction to the thought changes. If it works for you, the ontological truth of the thought will diminish, and you will feel less inclined to "give up."
Notice also, that if the exercise works for you, you may be inclined to think of the exercise as true in some ontological sense. If this happens, then put that thought on a leaf and see how the ontological truth of the exercise itself diminishes. This will help you see that the exercise is true only insofar as it works for you -remember the pragmatic truth criterion?
By the way, I haven't met anyone who can let the leaves float by 100 percent of the time. That is not realistic. With practice, however, you can let them float by for longer periods of time. You can practice this at home and you'll be able to do it more and more-it is a kind of meditative exercise really. In fact, if you practice the exercise regularly, you may find that it sometimes brings on a state of deep relaxation, or a feeling of peace and tranquillity. One might even say that it can lead to a mystical or spiritual experience. This is not to say, however, that the exercise is "magical." Even the mystical can yield to a behavior analysis. Consider the following.
The mystical is often spoken of as a nonphysical experience that in some way transcends physical reality. The mystical experience cannot be pOinted to or defined as a thing with specific boundaries in time and space, and cannot easily be described in ordinary language. Relational frame theory accounts, in part, for the transcendental and nondescriptive qualities of the mystical in terms of a massive reduction in the evaluative functions actualized by relational framing activities. Normally, when we engage in relational framing we constantly evaluate, HERE and NOW, events located THERE and THEN-for example, these objects are big, small, and medium sized; she is nice and he is nasty; that is difficult, but that is easy; that will take a long time, but that will not; and so on. If, however, the stimulus functions actualized by this activity are dramatically reduced, our evaluations may simply be observed HERE and NOW as just thoughts or behavioral events located THERE and THEN. In effect, our "normal" perception of reality, as ontologically real, is challenged when we experience our own ever-changing stream of evaluations as evaluations rather than as reflections of the way things really are. And of course, this experience of our own evaluations cannot be expressed in ordinary language without further evaluations, as "good," "bad," "weird," etc. From a relational frame perspective, this inability to verbalize such an experience, without further evaluations, gives rise to the intangible and inexpressible quality of the mystical experience. One is left, so to speak, with nothing more to say, because anything said would simply be another evaluation.
Something close to this experience may happen during the exercise as you place each thought on a leaf and watch it float away down the stream. In effect, you are learning to respond to your own "inner dialogue" as neither true nor false, good nor bad, pleasant nor unpleasant, etc.,-but to simply observe your thoughts as thoughts, and no more. This, I would argue, is an important feature of the mystical experience, and it is one that may be reached within the world view we call behavior-analysis.
[Some further discussion of spirituality and the mystical often arises at this point, and the work of Dymond and Barnes (1997) , Hayes, L. J. (1997) , Hayes, S. C. (1984 Hayes, S. C. ( , 1995 , and Williams (1986) are normally used as a means of presenting a behavior-analytic perspective on these issues].
Conclusion
Students exposed to the foregoing exercise, and a number of others that we use in our teaching, have all responded very positively in that we have noticed a marked increase in student interest in behavior analysis, and a marked reduction in negative comments about the discipline. As yet, however, we have not analyzed the effects of the exercise empirically. We could, for example, ask students to complete questionnaires before and after the exercise to determine whether it significantly changes their verbal statements about behavior analysis as an approach to psychology. An empirical analysis, however, is not necessary in the current context. We did not present the exercise to "prove" the effectiveness of a particular teaching method, but instead aimed to demonstrate how a behavior analyst might respond to the "troublesome" issue of behavioral reflexivity. When confronted with the reflexive nature of behavior analysis we responded as behavior analysts in that we (a) analyzed behavioral reflexivity as a behavioral phenomenon (i.e., the three scenarios), and (b) we applied the analysis to a practical problem (i.e., attracting students to behavior analysis with the teaching exercise). In effect, the statement "behavior analysiS is reflexive" led to behavioral events (the analysis and the teaching exercise) that were subsequently discriminated as "effective action" in the behavioral streams discriminated as "Dermot Barnes" and "Bryan Roche." In the current context, therefore, we find behavioral reflexivity to be a true and welcome feature of behavior analytic epistemology.
